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Abstract. Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its
own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency,
mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of
living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an
agent, neuroscientiﬁc data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a
successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling -
which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research
and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental,
biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is
explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting
action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochem‐
ical pulses. In exchange for this entropic beneﬁt, phenomenal energy is spent as
and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia.
1 Introduction
The thesis of strong artiﬁcial intelligence is that the mind is essentially a computer, such
that a suitably designed and programmed machine could pursue its own goals and have
phenomenal experiences (Johnson-Laird 1988). In this paper, I contend that these claims
are analytically and scientiﬁcally untenable, and describe a biological solution to the
mind body problem. My approach is naturalistic and scientiﬁc; I assume that agency
and qualia supervene on other phenomena that we take to be natural, and that qualia
have regular, discoverable eﬀects on the world. The theory I oﬀer is based on the eval‐
uation of hypotheses for their coherence with the concept of an agent, empirical data
and laws of physics. Scientiﬁc explanation often requires the postulation of mechanisms,
like the events by which an axon conducts an electro-chemical pulse (Machamer et al.
2000). Accordingly, the consideration of mechanisms is central to my method, which
leads me to infer that actions and feelings have a common origin in the homeostatic
nature of living matter.
The three main sections of the paper concern life, agency and qualia, respectively. I
ﬁrst review the relevant properties of a living system as an entity that is self-organized,
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and that maintains itself against thermodynamic decay. The next section concerns the
nature and source of agency. From the concept of an agent, I deduce that it is a living
substance. Because behavior motivated by a feeling has the homeostatic form of an
action, I infer that life is the source of qualia, and that mental causation is based in the
regulatory function of aﬀective experiences. In the third main section I address the nature
of qualia and the mechanism of their production. Laws of physics are adduced for the
hypothesis that a feeling depends on the matter and energy at its location, rather than a
causal pattern. From empirical evidence, I surmise that qualia are a distinct form of
energy, a property generated in specialized neurons. The subjectivity of qualia is
explained as required by thermodynamics if, by producing them, the source of the qualia
avoids an increase in its entropy. I conclude with some remarks on the merits of the
theory.
I avoid the term “consciousness” in the paper due to its many meanings, one of which
involves cognitive attention. Here, my theorizing on consciousness is limited to ‘qualia’,
what Block (1995) describes as ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ I use “subjective” to mean
that a quale is not objectively observable and, in that sense, is private to its subject.
2 Life
2.1 Life Is Self-organizing
The scientiﬁc view of life is that it is a natural phenomenon. A living cell is commonly
characterized as self-organized, that is, the structure of the cell results from the materials
that comprise it, not from an externally imposed design plan. Living matter is similar in
this way to other substances that depend on chemical forces for their composition (e.g.,
crystals, acids, proteins). No outside inﬂuence is needed for the internal organization of
such substances. As Pross (2003) explains, “living systems are no more than a mani‐
festation of a set of complex chemical reactions and, as such, are governed by the rules
of kinetics and thermodynamics.” The relevant implication with regard to agency is that
the behavior of a living organism in a particular environment is self-determined; its
movements result from the way its constituent materials organized themselves.
2.2 Life Is Self-maintaining
Jonas (2001) writes that “in living things, nature springs an ontological surprise in which
the world-accident of terrestrial conditions brings to light an entirely new possibility of
being: systems of matter that are unities of a manifold … in virtue of themselves, for
the sake of themselves, and continually sustained by themselves.” Like all systems, a
living organism obeys the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy
(i.e., disorder) of an isolated system increases with time. That is, every system tends to
decay to its equilibrium state of maximum disorganization; for a living thing, this dete‐
rioration results in its death. Preventing or slowing this breakdown requires the expen‐
diture of energy from outside the system. In this regard, a living cell functions somewhat
like a refrigerator; it consumes energy from external sources to prevent thermal decom‐
position. However, a refrigerator only slows the decay of things inside it, while a cell
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sustains its own substance. Schrödinger (1944) views this capability as unique to living
matter, and explains that “the device by which an organism maintains itself stationary
at a fairly high level of orderliness (=fairly low level of entropy) really consists in
continually sucking orderliness from its environment.”
The life-supporting order that is obtained from the environment is ‘free energy’ in
various forms, energy at a suﬃciently low level of entropy such that it can be metabolized
by the organism. For life on earth, the ultimate source of free energy is sunlight, which
is used by plants to construct organic complexes that contain chemical energy. Much of
the energy and material consumed by a living cell is used in re-synthesizing the
numerous proteins required to maintain the cell, as the proteins continually degrade
(Pross 2012). Systems that consume energy to maintain themselves in a far-from-equi‐
librium state are described as ‘dissipative’ by Prigogine (1978) in that they reduce the
amount of free energy in the environment, the energy that can be used for work.
Schneider and Kay (1994) hold that “life should be viewed as the most sophisticated
(until now) end in the continuum of development of natural dissipative structures, from
physical to chemical to autocatalytic to living systems.”
Maturana and Varela (1980) characterize a living system as a mechanism that is
homeostatic with regard to its own composition. They use the term “autopoietic” (i.e.,
self-constructing) for such a system: “an autopoietic machine continuously generates
and speciﬁes its own organization through its operation as a system of production of its
own components … it has its own organization (deﬁning network of relations) as the
fundamental variable which it maintains constant.”
So, a living cell is self-organized, and its movements are self-determined relative to
its environment. Those movements involve the consumption of materials and energy to
repair the structure of the cell against the eﬀects of heat and other threats to its biological
integrity. A living cell is a homeostatic (i.e., self-maintaining) substance.
3 Agency and Mental Causation
Conceptually, an agent is something that moves itself to realize a goal; such behavior is
termed an action. The lack of the goal is the motivation for an action, and the movement
for the objective is initiated and controlled by the agent itself. A successful action
concludes with the attainment of the goal, which ends the motivation for the behavior.
3.1 An Agent Is a Type of Substance
An agent ‘moves itself’ in the sense that it determines the way it behaves in response to
some stimulus. An agent is ‘active’; its movement is powered by energy it contains. In
the words of Barandarian et al. (2009), “an agent is a source of activity, not merely a
passive suﬀerer of the eﬀects of external forces.”
In general, the two determinants of a system’s movement are the characteristics
(material and form) of its components, and their organization. Computers and the oper‐
ations they perform are multiply realizable: the same sequence of computational oper‐
ations (i.e., the algorithm or software program) can be implemented using a wide variety
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of materials, and the same material can be used to realize a limitless variety of compu‐
tational algorithms.
Because a computer is multiply realizable, the speciﬁc sequence of operations it
performs depends only on its organizational structure. But this structure is not deter‐
mined by the material of the computer. If it were, the same type of material could not
be used to run many diﬀerent programs. So, the material composition and functional
organization that determines how a computer moves is not intrinsic to the computer. It
is not an agent, but a tool of its designer.
Accordingly, a necessary property of an agent is that it is self-organized, which
makes it the source of its own behavior. This entails that the structure of an agent depends
on forces that are intrinsic to its components. Hence, an agent is organized by chemical
bonding, forces that inhere in the very nature of the joined materials. But when entities
combine chemically, the resulting substance diﬀers in kind from its constituents taken
individually. For example, the characteristics of hydrogen and oxygen are lost when
they bond to form water.
So, the concept of an agent entails that it is a chemically composed substance, one
which consumes energy to move for a goal.
3.2 Agency Depends on Living Matter
What kind of chemical substance is an agent? An action commences with some sort of
change within its agent, a change that disturbs the agent from its quiescent state. This
change ‘motivates’ (i.e., is the proximate cause of) the action. But because an agent
moves for a goal, it must also be the ‘want’ of the goal that triggers its movement. So,
the want of the goal is the motivating change in the agent. Accordingly, the goal of an
action is to undo the change in the agent that motivated the movement, thereby returning
the agent to its prior ‘resting’ state. Hence, a successful action has a ‘circular’ form; it
begins and ends in the same entity within the agent. In contrast, a reﬂex is a ‘linear’,
programmed movement that, once initiated, is carried out irrespective of its eﬀect (if
any) on that which triggered it. Unlike a reﬂex, an action has a homeostatic nature; an
agent moves to keep itself in a certain state. And, as argued above, it is a substance that
determines its own movement. Hence, an agent is a material having a homeostatic nature.
The concept of an agent accords with the unique character of living matter. A devi‐
ation from its self-maintaining activity causes a living cell to expend energy such that,
if its movement is eﬀective, the cell returns itself to a more sustainable, dynamic state.
I believe that Aristotle recognizes the homeostatic basis of agency where, in Apostle’s
(1981) translation of de Anima, he asserts that “the principle of moving and stopping …
is a power of such a nature as to preserve that which has it and to preserve it qua such.”
Aristotle coins a word for this power: entelecheia. In his literal translation, Sachs (2001)
takes this term to mean “being at work staying itself”. This description of an agent is
fully consistent with the scientiﬁc characterization of life as reviewed above, wherein a
cell is depicted as consuming energy in a manner that maintains its material composition
and structure - thereby enabling it to continue this very activity. A living cell is its own
goal.
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But living organisms do not necessarily behave in this way; a moth that ﬂies into a
ﬂame apparently moves reﬂexively, rather than for self-preservation. How, then, do
some living organisms move as agents?
3.3 Qualia Originate in Living Matter
A movement of an organism that is motivated by an aﬀective feeling has the homeostatic
form of an action; successful behavior ends the painful or pleasurable feeling. The usual
response to thirst is an example; the feeling that motivates the movement is extinguished
in the organism when it restores itself to its hydrated condition. Similarly, behavior for
pleasure ends when satiation is reached. Damasio (2012) remarks that “in brains capable
of representing internal states … the parameters associated with a homeostatic range
correspond, at conscious levels of processing, to the experiences of pain and pleasure.”
On the assumption that a feeling is caused by some change in its subject, hedonically
motivated movement is an action; attainment of the goal occurs when the part of the
organism that produced the feeling is returned to its prior, resting state. In this regard,
Spencer (1855) notes that feeling-related movements begin when reﬂexive motion ends:
“…as the psychical changes become too complicated to be perfectly automatic, they
become incipiently sensational. Memory, Reason, and Feeling take their rise at the same
time.” With my earlier inference that an action is a movement of living matter, the
observation that hedonic feelings can motivate actions enables a straightforward deduc‐
tion regarding the origin of at least some types of qualia:
Every action is caused by a change in a living substance.
Some actions are caused by aﬀective feelings.
An aﬀective feeling is caused by a change in a living substance.
This deduction is speciﬁc to hedonic feelings. But all qualia are subjective, and I will
argue in Sect. 4.4 that subjectivity results from the living nature of the source of qualia.
Assuming that is correct, it entails that all qualia - not just the aﬀective types - depend
on life. The syllogism above also presumes that qualia can inﬂuence behavior in some
way. The question of how that occurs is the problem of mental causation.
3.4 Qualia Aﬀect Behavior as Control Signals
For some, the claim that feelings can inﬂuence physical movement is equivalent to
Cartesian interactionist dualism. This is the view that mind and body are fundamentally
diﬀerent, but that there are causal connections between them. Dualism is not entailed
by interactionism, however. In Newton’s time, many held that his theory of gravity
required the existence of a supernatural phenomenon, because it was widely believed
that all forces operated by contact (Gibbon 2002). The current, ‘physicalist’ view of the
world reﬂects a stance similar to that of Newton’s critics; physicalists typically claim
that the ‘physical’ (i.e., non-mental) world is causally closed. But this is contrary to
experience. If a phenomenon had no causal relationships with the rest of the world, we
would be totally oblivious of it - but we are not oblivious to qualia. In Russell’s (1959)
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view, they are the only sort of thing we know by direct ‘acquaintance’, rather than
through inference.
On the theory of qualia oﬀered here, they can have eﬀects at two levels. At the micro-
level of their production, qualia beneﬁt the biological integrity of their living source, as
I will posit in accounting for their subjectivity. At a higher level of organization, a
phenomenal experience can prompt an organism to act in some way, as assumed in the
previous section with the example of thirst.
A possible objection to the view that qualia can cause actions is that, if they were to
inﬂuence an organism’s movement, they would have to do so by exerting a telekinetic
force on neural activity - and there is no evidence of such a force. But telekinesis is not
necessary for feelings to aﬀect behavior; they can do so as control signals. Analogously,
a ship can be steered automatically using light from stars, even though the starlight exerts
no relevant force on the ship. All that is required is that the ship be able to detect the
stars, measure their positions relative to its heading, and adjust its course accordingly.
All the force needed to change the direction of the ship is supplied by the ship itself, not
by the stars. Similarly, no force on neural activity is needed for a feeling to aﬀect the
behaviour of an organism; the organism need only detect the feeling and respond to it
in some way – generally, by selecting a type of movement that will inﬂuence the feeling
(e.g., by eliminating the organism’s thirst).
One source of the perceived diﬃculty in understanding mental causation is a line of
reasoning that Kim (2005) calls the “supervenience argument”. Let M be the experiential
property of a mental state like pain, where M supervenes on its physical base P. M is
thought to cause P*, some neural event that results in pain-reducing behavior. But P also
appears to be the cause of P*, in which case P* is causally over-determined. Such dual
causation is very unlikely so either M is reducible in some way to P, or M is epipheno‐
menal.
This argument posits that the neural state P, on which M supervenes, is also the cause
of P*, the physical response to M. But this is generally not the case. Between the feeling
and the behavioral response to it, there can be a lengthy interval of practical reasoning
concerning the type of movement (if any) to perform. Otherwise, every movement would
be a reﬂex. Hence, M supervenes on P, but P does not cause P*. M and P* have diﬀerent
causal bases, so causal over-determination is not entailed by M’s supervenience on P.
This can be seen with the ship analogy wherein one mechanism (a photo-detector)
produces a control signal from the starlight, and a separate, mechanical system uses that
signal to adjust the ship’s rudder.
Hence, the science of mental causation is that of control theory (i.e., cybernetics),
wherein the operation of a system is typically adjusted based on an error signal that
represents the diﬀerence between the goal for the system and its actual state (Ashby
1956). A number of theorists have characterized goal-oriented behaviour as a process
involving feedback control (MacKay 1966; Powers 1973; Carver 1979; Carver and
Scheier 1981; Marken 2002). The ‘navigation’ of an organism using its feelings as
control signals is similar to the stellar navigation of a ship – except that, in the case of
the organism, the source of the feedback signals is internal to the ‘vessel’. The organism
experiences aﬀective qualia and, using learned behavior and/or practical reasoning,
responds accordingly. Just as the imagined ship can’t navigate without the starlight, an
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organism that is guided by its feelings is in mortal danger without them. Humans that
lack sensitivity to pain often die before reaching adulthood, because they fail to notice
injuries (Nagasako et al. 2003).
The view that aﬀective qualia perform a control function is not new to psychology;
Cannon (1932) describes the role that feelings like hunger and thirst perform in the
homeostatic regulation of bodily requirements - like water, sugar, proteins, fat and
calcium, as well as the oxygen and salt contents of the blood. Schulze and Mariano
(2004) oﬀer the following, generalized account:
Since hedonic states arise whenever a control system produces a chronic regulation error, this
implies that the control system is unable to regulate an important physiological variable within
the limits required to maintain the integrity of the organism. The hedonic states that arise in
response to an increasing regulation error serve to co-opt the behavioral system and its resources.
It is then up to the latter to select and execute the appropriate behaviors drawing on cognitive
systems in the process.
In addition to physiological conditions, thoughts can also result in motivating feel‐
ings, as Hume (1739) describes:
’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a
consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will
give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. ’Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but
making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its
original one by the relation of cause and eﬀect.
So, an action may be stimulated by the anticipation of pleasure or pain, and this
apparently occurs through a faint experience of the expected feeling. Freud famously
contends that this sort of process can occur subconsciously, causing us to pursue or
repress particular thoughts and memories. Hence, aﬀective feelings function as control
signals that motivate an organism to think and/or move to realize a goal-state.
The ability to respond to their feelings conferred a signiﬁcant biological advantage
on those species that evolved this capability. An organism that is limited to reﬂexive
movements is constrained by its evolutionary past, like the aforementioned moth that
ﬂies into a ﬂame. In contrast, motivation by its aﬀective feelings enables an individual
organism to respond in the present, to new threats and opportunities. Such a phenotype
has the possibility to cognitively ‘adapt’ to some types of events within its own lifetime.
4 The Nature and Mechanism of Qualia
I inferred above that the source of qualia is some sort of living substance. In this section,
I consider the ontological nature of qualia and the type of event that realizes them.
Whereas the arguments concerning agency were mainly analytical, with regard to qualia
they are primarily scientiﬁc.
4.1 Qualia Are Energy Generated in Specialized Neurons
Qualia appear to be a form of energy. We detect them, and detection generally relies on
transduction - the conversion of energy from one form to another. Qualia can carry
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information for both cognitive and behavioral functions, and communications theory
holds that information is modulated energy. Additionally, it seems that everything
recognized by modern physics is energy of some type, so feelings might be as well. This
supposition is consistent with various observations. These include data from brain stim‐
ulation reward experiments, the perceived intensity of sensations as a function of neural
activity, phenomenal experiences of some types, and measurements of energy consump‐
tion by the brain.
When humans undergo electrical stimulation at some brain sites, they report expe‐
riences of pleasure (Heath, 1964). So compelling is the eﬀect on some subjects that the
use of this technique raises ethical issues (Oshima and Katayama 2010). In Brain Stim‐
ulation Reward studies on rats, electrical pulses are applied to regions of a rat’s brain
that correspond anatomically to these human ‘pleasure centers’; one that is typically
targeted is the medial forebrain bundle. A rat will work for these pulses; its motivation
is measured by the eﬀort it expends to obtain the reward.
A key result from these experiments is that the strength of the reward eﬀect depends
on the total ﬁring rate produced in the relevant neurons, not on the form of the stimulating
pulse train (Gallistel et al. 1981; Shizgal, 1999; Simmons and Gallistel 1994). An
explanation of this phenomenon suggests itself: the relevant neurons transform the
electro-chemical energy of the neural spikes to the phenomenal energy of pleasure, the
perceived intensity of the pleasure is proportional to the aggregate energy of the
converted neural pulses, and a rat works harder for rewarding pleasure that is more
intense.
The strength of sensory qualia also appears to depend on the energy in the associated
neurons. In a study on odors, the experienced intensity of a smell correlated with the
rate of neural impulses in the amygdala (Winston et al. 2005). Similarly, Mather (2006)
reports that “the most successful model of loudness perception … proposes that the
overall loudness of a given sound is proportional to the total neural activity evoked by
it in the auditory nerve.” The rate of neural ﬁrings has also been observed to have
considerable inﬂuence on the visual perception of brightness (Kinoshita and Komatsu
2001) and on the tactile perception of the amplitude of a surface vibration (Bensmaia
2008).
Certain types of phenomenal experiences also support the hypothesis that qualia
result from an energy transduction, rather than information processing. A strong blow
to the head produces the visual sensation of ‘seeing stars’. Apparently, some of the
mechanical energy of the jolt is transduced to action potentials in those neurons that
convert the pulses to visual qualia. Also, visible and audible white noise carry no infor‐
mation, so there can be no symbolic representation in the resulting neural activity to the
eﬀect that ‘this is noise’. Yet, an experience of such a phenomenon provides us with
knowledge of its random character and its strength; how can this be? Although noise
lacks information, it does consist of energy. Evidently, the energy comprising the neural
noise is converted to a phenomenal experience, one which retains the relative intensity
and spectral properties of the aggregated neural pulses.
Additionally, some measurements of energy consumption by the brain support the
hypothesis that a portion of that energy is converted to feelings. Using positron emission
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Raichle (2006)
AQ1
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measured the brain’s responses to controlled stimuli (in terms of changes in blood ﬂow).
Because the increase in energy consumption due to the stimuli was much less than
expected, he surmised that “the brain apparently uses most of its energy for functions
unaccounted for.” Raichle calls this ‘dark energy’ and posits that it supports intrinsic
neural activity for functions like the maintenance of information.
I hypothesize that at least part of this energy is spent in the production of qualia, a
fundamental form of energy that was not captured in Raichle’s measurements. When
awake, we are continuously subjected to feelings of various kinds (both conscious and
subconscious) in sensing our external and internal environments. If phenomenal expe‐
riences are a form of energy, generating those feelings would increase the baseline
metabolic rate of the brain. This would explain the considerable amount of energy that
was ‘missing’ in Raichle’s studies.
In principle, the sort of experiment performed by Raichle could provide a means for
falsifying the hypothesis that qualia are a form of energy. If that theory is correct, meas‐
urements of regions that are sources of feelings should show more ‘missing’ energy than
locations that are not. Such an experiment depends on identifying the areas of the brain
that produce qualia, and on a measurement technique with suﬃcient spatial resolution
to distinguish those regions from locations that don’t generate feelings.
4.2 A Phenomenal Experience Depends on a Local Event
There are two alternatives regarding the spatio-temporal nature of the event(s) that cause
a phenomenal experience. One is the computational hypothesis that a quale results from
a causal pattern, such that the existence and character of a quale depend on multiple
events distributed over space and time. The other possibility is that a quale is caused by
a singular event at a particular space-time location. For the latter alternative, a quale
must depend on the type of matter and/or energy at its location; otherwise, it would be
under-determined. From the concept of an action, I inferred above that a phenomenal
experience has its origin in some type of substance. Here, I argue again for this claim -
this time mainly from science.
The causal-pattern hypothesis faces a challenge from physics in the principle of
locality, which holds that an event at a space-time location depends only on what is at
that location. Einstein expressed the importance of this principle in a letter to Max Born
(1971, 171): “If this axiom were to be completely abolished, the idea of the existence
of quasi-enclosed systems, and thereby the postulation of laws which can be checked
empirically in the accepted sense, would become impossible.” Intuitively, the locality
principle seems correct; how could an event at some instant be inﬂuenced by things that
are not at the event’s location at that instant? Locality does not preclude the existence
of causal ‘chains’ over space and time, but it does entail that the type of event that occurs
at a time and place depends only on what exists then and there. The motion of a billiard
ball may have its historical cause in a complex pattern of collisions involving many
other balls, but the type of motion a ball exhibits is due only to the way it is impacted
by the last ball in the sequence. In general, the locality principle is evident in laws of
physics, which do not include any time delays or spatial separations between causes and
eﬀects. A changing magnetic ﬁeld produces an electric ﬁeld when and where the change
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in the magnetic ﬁeld occurs. A mass is accelerated by gravity in proportion to the strength
of the gravitational ﬁeld at the space-time location of the mass.
Turing’s (1950) canonical characterization of a computer also conforms to the
locality principle. The next state of his machine depends only on the current state and
the input to that state, as reﬂected in the computer’s ‘machine table’. Accordingly, an
eﬀect that depended on a pattern of prior machine states would not be the result of a
computation. Furthermore, the supervenience formulation of ‘minimal physicalism’ as
described by Kim (1998) also reﬂects locality: “Mental properties supervene on physical
properties, in that necessarily, for any mental property M, if anything has M at time t,
there exists a physical base (or subvenient) property P such that it has P at t, and neces‐
sarily anything that has P at a time has M at that time.” [my underline] This precludes
a ‘physicalist’ view of mental states as realizations of causal patterns.
It might be contended that locality does not apply to some types of events, those that
exhibit what is called ‘quantum entanglement.’ Einstein was sceptical of this phenom‐
enon, which he termed ‘spooky action at a distance’. But this eﬀect has been conﬁrmed
experimentally; the spin-polarizations of electrons generated in pairs and then separated
seem, when measured, to inﬂuence each other instantaneously across space. The speciﬁc
basis for this dependence is debated, but the possible explanations all appear to entail a
non-local inﬂuence of some kind (Yanofsky, 2013).
Nevertheless, quantum entanglement can’t rescue causal-pattern theories of qualia
- especially if feelings are a form of energy. Information can’t be conveyed using entan‐
gled properties, and there is no evidence that neural activity in the brain depends on non-
local eﬀects. Whether a particular neuron ﬁres is fully explained by local events at its
synapse; it does not depend on the history of those events. Furthermore, if a feeling is
realized by an energy transform, that event must be localized - or fundamental laws of
physics would be violated. Speciﬁcally, if the emerging energy-type did not come into
being at the same time that the prior type is extinguished, there would be a violation of
the conservation of energy in the interim. Or, if the new form of energy did not arise at
the same place as the prior type, the relativistic limit on the speed of signalling would
be breached.
Ironically, the physicalist view that a quale depends on a causal pattern implies some
sort of non-physical causation. Consider two computers that are in qualitatively identical
physical states at some instant. The ﬁrst has executed the computational algorithm that
is thought to be necessary for realizing some feeling, while the second has simply been
placed in the same, resulting state. If the ﬁrst computer has a phenomenal experience
while the second does not, that diﬀerence could only be due to some non-physical
inﬂuence because, by stipulation, the two computers are physically identical. Any
‘memories’ of the computational sequence that exist in the ﬁrst computer would also be
duplicated in the second - unless those ‘memories’ were non-physical.
Therefore, a feeling depends only on that which exists at its space-time location,
which entails that qualia are determined by a particular kind of ‘stuﬀ’. In Sect. 3.3 above,
I deduced that qualia originate in living matter, but it remains to consider the sort of
mechanism by which they are realized, and why they are private.
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4.3 Qualia Are Subjective Because They Are Spent as They Are Produced
Subjectivity concerns the process of observation. In general, observation is a form of
communication in which energy of some type carries information from the event of
interest, to the observer. Objective observation requires that, in principle, any observer
could have received the very same modulated energy. So, for a feeling to be objectively
observable qua feeling, some of the phenomenal energy would have to leave its source.
Evidently, this is not possible for qualia. A similar circumstance exists in the cosmo‐
logical phenomenon of a black hole. Any light produced by, or within the vicinity of,
the ‘hole’ is not observable because it can’t escape the gravitational force of the collapsed
star.
This suggests that a feeling is subjective because it does not escape its origin. Unlike
the energetic property of thermal heat, phenomenal energy is apparently not transferrable
by contact, nor is it radiated. But the energy of a phenomenal experience can’t simply
disappear when the experience stops; it must be transformed to energy of another kind.
I posit that qualia are converted to another type of energy as, and where, they are gener‐
ated. The homeostatic character of life oﬀers a clue to the nature of that energy trans‐
duction.
4.4 Qualia Are a Defense Mechanism of Their Living Micro-source
I have argued that the source of qualia is some type of living matter. In addition to
metabolizing energy and materials to keep itself going, a living cell defends itself against
some dangers to its well-being. One such mechanism is its construction of heat-shock
proteins when the cell is confronted with various threats - like thermal changes, oxidative
stress, or some toxic substances (Richter et al. 2010). I hypothesize that, like the produc‐
tion of heat-shock proteins, the generation of qualia serves a defensive, homeostatic
function for the living matter that produces feelings in specialized neurons. I shall use
the term “q-source” for this substance. I posit that action potentials in these neurons
threaten the biological integrity of the q-source, and it avoids harm from the neural spikes
by converting them to feelings.
Why does this make feelings private? The second law of thermodynamics dictates
that preventing an increase in the entropy of the q-source requires the expenditure of
energy, just as a refrigerator must use energy to slow the increase in the entropy of its
contents. If the act of transforming neural pulses into qualia averts a threat to the biolog‐
ical integrity of the source of the qualia, energy must be consumed for that beneﬁt. That
energy apparently comes from the qualia themselves; if so, they never leave their source.
As they are generated, qualia are transformed immediately to another type of energy;
this precludes objective observation of them. I earlier analogized the q-source to a
refrigerator. If the above account of qualia’s generation is correct, the q-source is a
remarkable sort of refrigerator. Unlike the kind of machine we use to preserve food,
which requires energy from an external source, the energy used by the q-source to ‘cool’
the ‘hot’ things inside it (i.e., the action potentials) comes from those very things!
A diﬀerent perspective might clarify this postulated mechanism. Living matter
contains potential energy that resides in its structure, an organization of atoms and
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molecules that enables the substance to perform the activities that keep it alive. I
hypothesize that action potentials can damage the organizational structure of the q-
source. As neural activity begins to have this eﬀect, the q-source reacts by converting
the electro-chemical pulses to feelings. Ridding itself of the neural spikes in this way
enables the q-source to return to its original structure, which beneﬁt is compensated by
the immediate expenditure of the qualia. Energy is thereby conserved; the energy in the
neural pulses is converted to the energy of the feeling, which is instantly exchanged for
the potential energy of the q-source. Accordingly, the generation of feelings is an action
of the q-source that is due to its homeostatic nature; qualia are produced by living matter
of some kind.
5 Concluding Remarks
The biological theory described in this paper is more scientiﬁcally conservative than the
dominant, computationalist hypothesis because, while it posits a new form of energy, it
does not violate any law of physics. And it explains more.
Regarding agency, the multiple realizability of a computer entails that the form of
its movement has an external source (its designer), while the intrinsic nature of living
matter bestows it with self-determined behavior for a self-determined goal: itself. The
computational theory does not fundamentally distinguish actions from reﬂexes. On the
biological hypothesis, actions exhibit the ‘circular’, homeostatic movement of a self-
sustaining substance, while reﬂexes have a ‘linear’, programmed form. Functionalist
theories struggle to ﬁnd a causal role for the experiential aspect of a feeling, but this is
not a problem for the biological theory wherein aﬀective qualia serve as control signals
in the regulatory processes by which a living organism maintains itself.
The central assumption of the computationalist view, that a phenomenal experience
is determined by a causal pattern, contradicts the locality principle of physics. It thereby
entails a radical form of causation that deﬁes space and time. The biological theory does
not violate locality; it postulates that a quale is the product of a singular, localized event:
an energy transduction. No scientiﬁc account of subjectivity is provided by the orthodox,
functionalist theory, while subjectivity is nomologically necessitated if, at the micro-
level, qualia prevent an increase in the entropy of their source – a function that accords
with the homeostatic character of life. Neither theory accounts for the experiential prop‐
erty of a feeling, but this epistemological failing is consistent with the inference that
qualia are a fundamental form of energy.
No part of the biological theory is ad hoc. As pictured in Fig. 1, it provides integrated,
mutually supporting accounts of agency, qualia and their subjectivity - all scientiﬁcally
based in the thermodynamically unique, self-maintaining nature of living matter.
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Action
homeostatic 
movement
Qualia 
homeostatic 
energy
qualia defend life
life produces qualia
actions support life
life is the source of actions
qualia motivate action action influences qualia
Life
homeostatic 
substance
Fig. 1. Agency and qualia depend on the homeostatic nature of life.
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